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”The Harvest of Anger” 
Politics of Salvation and Ethnic-cleansing  
in 1940s Romania: 
Fascist Thinkers and Authoritarian Doers∗ 
MIHAI CHIOVEANU 
 
 
”It is an anti-Semitic delirium that nothing can stop. 
There are no breaks, no rhyme or reason […] This is sheer 
uncontrolled bestiality without shame or conscience, 
without goal or purpose. Anything, absolutely anything, is possible” 
Mihail SEBASTIAN (October 20, 1941) 
 
”As for the Jewish question, today in any case one could say that a man 
like Antonescu, for example, proceeds much more radically in this matter 
than we have done until now. But I will not rest or be idle until we too have 
gone all the way with the Jews” 
Adolf HITLER (August 20, 1941) 
 
 
 
During the Second World War, between 270 000 and 320 000 Jews, 12 500 
Roma and Sinti, and thousands of Ukrainian and Russian civilians died at the 
hands of the Romanian authorities. The huge number of victims is the direct result 
of an intentional, state sponsored and organized policy of ethnic-cleansing imple-
mented from 1940 up to 1944 by an authoritarian and semi-reactionary regime 
with certain fascist features, and backed for a short period of time by a fascist party 
and its paramilitary formations1. 
In Romania, unlike in Nazi Germany, the fascists played mostly the role of 
”thinkers” rather than doers in the Holocaust. However, a considerable number of 
Romanian fascists, the infamous legionari, perpetrated deadly assault against the 
Jews long before September 1940, as well as in the period after January 19412, while 
the Bucharest pogrom from January 1941, with its 122 Jewish victims, comes 
entirely to the responsibility of the Iron Guard. This is not to exonerate and thus 
                                                    
∗ A draft of the present paper was presented at the 12th ASN World Convention held at 
Columbia University, New York, in April 2007. The author expresses his gratitude for the kind 
financial support offered by Higher Education Support Program/Open Society Institute. I am 
also grateful to Professor Daniel Barbu (University of Bucharest), Professor Armin Heinen 
(University of Aachen), and Mrs. Radu Ioanid (USHMM-Washington D.C.) for their critics, 
suggestions and comments on the draft. 
1 Michael MANN defines it as a ”fascist fellow-traveler” that borrowed corporatist and 
fascist trappings. See Michael MANN, Fascists, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, 
p. 293. See also, Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, HarperCollins Publishers, New 
York, 2007, p. 70. 
2 Many legionari were identified as perpetrators in the Holocaust after January 1941. Yet, this 
time, they acted as army and gendarmerie soldiers and officers, and as civilians, but no longer as 
members of a fascist militia and party in control of the state and its institutions. 
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sanitarize Romanian fascism (and fascists), as the legionari played a vital, essential 
role in the complex process that ultimately led to genocide yet, of a different kind1. 
As my paper attempts to indicate, apart from the long lasting anti-Semitic rage 
and hate2, anger as a strong political motivation3, and ethnic-cleansing as an ideo-
logical core constituency, which altogether played a central role in shaping An-
tonescu’s regime policies during the Holocaust, represent but the legacy of Roma-
nian fascism, a ”form of palingenetic, revolutionary ultra-nationalism”4, heading for 
a transcendental and cleansing nation-statism through paramilitarism5. Conse-
quently, Antonescu’s regime was not simply a puppet and one of ”Hitler’s willing 
executioners”, as Holocaust historians sometimes portray them. In other words, 
Romanians followed their own path, developed and later implemented their own 
genocidal project, somewhat independently from Nazi Germany, whose presence 
and overwhelming role in Eastern Europe in the 1940 was only to favor, and in 
some respects facilitate, the Romanian actions6. Nevertheless, one should keep in 
mind the fact that the Romanian actions also gave a new impulse to the German 
policies as long as the Legionar rebellion (and the pogrom) was for Hitler a sign of 
growing awareness and anti-Semitism, with Europeans following the German 
anti-Semitic lead, the Romanian army and gendarmerie sometimes outperformed 
Einsatzgruppen D in 1941, and Romanian murder policies ”mixed in a particularly 
lethal brew” with the German ones7. 
Following this, the Romanians rabid anti-Semitism, an aspect that was 
over-researched8, will be discussed briefly, as my main focus is on anger as a politi-
cal key motivation of the revolutionary Iron Guard, the Romanian fascist and para-
military movement, and latter on of the frustrated and unrestrained dictatorship of 
                                                    
1 See Armin HEINEN, Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihail. O contribuţie la problema fascismului 
internaţional, Editura Humanitas, Romanian transl. by C. and D. Esianu, Bucureşti, 1999, pp. 411-424. 
Much to radical and rebellious, immature and therefore unable to consolidate power, the legionari 
went within months into an open conflict with Antonescu, the army, and the regime. Banned, and 
with a leadership forced to fly into exile in the aftermath of their failed revolution, the legionari 
simply missed the moment to act as doers, as Romania decided to wage war on USSR, and the 
Romanian Jewry, only months later. 
2 See Robert PAXTON, The Anatomy of Fascism, Penguin Books, London, 2005, pp. 20, 79, 97. 
Paxton defines the Legion of the Archangel Michael as the most ecstatically of all fascist parties 
and one of the ”readiest to kill Jews and bourgeois politicians”. 
3 I will not use anger simply as a journalistic convention and approach it as a natural 
response, a reaction of a human being to a situation of mortal danger, but as a relevant factor that 
distorts the decision making process, and it is often dramatized, ritualized and turned into 
routine. See Peter CALVERT, ”Autocracy, Anger and the Politics of Salvation”, Totalitarian 
Movements and Political Religion, vol. 1, no. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 1-2.  
4 Roger GRIFFIN, The Nature of Fascism, St’Martin’s Press, New York, 1991, pp. 26-29. 
5 Michael MANN, Fascists, cit, p. 13. 
6 See Cristopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution. The Evolution of Nazi Jewish 
Policy, September 1939-March 1942, University of Nebraska Press, Yad Vashem, Lincoln, Jerusalem, 
2004, pp. 275-277. There was no need for the Germans to tell Romanians that Jews are deadly 
enemy as the large scale killing perpetrated by the Romanians following the German example 
were but the peak of a long anti-Semitic tradition. Romanians wasted no time to implement their 
pre-war plans, with Germans observing than trying to control and direct the Romanian cleansing, 
to mold the disorganized mass violence into a controlled pattern of systematic extermination. 
7 Saul FRIELANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit, pp. 166,169, 225. 
8 See Leon VOLOVICI, Nationalist Ideology and Antisemitism. The Case of Romanian Intellectuals 
in the 1930s, Pergamon Press, New York, 1991; also Carol IANCU, Evreii din România (1919-1938). 
De la emancipare la marginalizare, Editura Hasefer, Bucureşti, 2000. 
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Ion Antonescu that turned to the armed forces, police, and the gendarmerie as pro-
fessional practitioners of violence, as to enforce his ideal vision of the nation and 
society, and implement his Politics of Salvation1. Accordingly, I will point out that 
ethnic-cleansing was triggered not only by the hyper-nationalism and ardent, vio-
lent anti-Semitism but also by the determination, and possibility, especially with 
the advent of war against USSR, of the Romanian government to vent ”righteous 
anger” on the weak, thus adding the ”cleansing of the ground” to the (sense of) 
magnitude of an otherwise failed domestic policy and uncertain and much too 
costly military ”victory” against the external enemy. 
In this sense, I will not follow the entire process in which hundred of thousands 
of Romanian and Ukrainian Jews perished in nocturnal death marches, sealed wag-
ons, of starvation, plagues, public executions, and mass killing operations that of-
ten turned into a carnage that exhausts the reader2. Instead, I will try to find an ex-
planation for the paroxysmal violence of the mid 1940-late 1941 period, and the en-
thusiasm of the perpetrators, manifested on so many levels, from the simple sol-
dier and gendarme to the high rank officer, from the anonymous civil servant to 
the top bureaucrat invested with the superior and implacable authority of the 
State3. This kind of approach offers me an excellent methodological hint and justi-
fies a fresh look into the ”unmasterable issues” of fascism and the Holocaust in Ro-
mania, as my selection of themes and the interpretation that derives from them 
aims first to explore and then synthesize several aspects that were hitherto ne-
glected, or rapidly discarded by historians. 
One particular aspect that draw the special attention of many historians writing 
or simply touching upon the Romanian Holocaust, is the huge number of Jewish 
victims in the first stages of the war due the fascist and military violence of Roma-
nian mass killings in savage massacres that do not resemble the latter bureaucratic 
killings4. The striking cruelty of the less structured in its brutality (when compared 
to the nazi one) Romanian process of destruction of the Jews, a process that did not 
included gas chambers, but in which not one community was spared, pinpoints the 
existence of one factor, other than anti-Semitism and ethnic-cleansing, which plays 
an important role in the equation of the Romanian Holocaust5. A second relevant 
                                                    
1 The issue was briefly introduced by Vladimir Tismăneanu in the case of Romanian fascism 
and Sorin Alexandrescu in the case of Antonescu’s regime. See Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, Dan 
PAVEL, ”Romania's Mystical Revolutionaries: the Generation of Angst and Adventure Revisited”, 
East European Politics & Societies, vol. 8, no. 3, 1994, pp. 402-438. See also Sorin ALEXANDRESCU, 
Paradoxul român, Editura Univers, Bucureşti, 1998, pp 155-158. 
2 For an excellent and accurate account of the crimes perpetrated by the Romanians during 
the Holocaust see Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu, Editura Hasefer, Bucureşti, 1998. 
3 In his forthcoming book on the Romanian Holocaust Armin Heinen introduces no less than 
five categories of violence: dictatorial, fascist, military, collective, and bureaucratic. For a brief 
presentation of his thesis and arguments see Armin HEINEN, ”Locul pogromului de la Iaşi în 
cadrul Holocaustului Românesc”, in George VOICU (ed.), Pogromul de la Iaşi, 28-30 iunie 1941. 
Prologul Holocaustului din România, Polirom, Iaşi, 2006, pp. 129-132. I will focus mainly on the 
handicraft killing and butchery with drilling insensitivity, and despite strain, on the fascist and 
military violence of June 1940-October 1941. 
4 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 305-306 
5 Radu IOANID, The Sword of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania, Bolder, New York, 
1990, p. 207. See also Lucy DAWIDOWICZ, Războiul împotriva evreilor. 1933-1945, Romanian 
transl. by C. Paţac, Editura Hasefer, Bucureşti, 1999, p. 348; Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele 
Carol şi Mareşalul Antonescu. Relaţiile germano-române. 1938-1944, Romanian transl. by S. Neagoe, 
Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1994, p. 280.  
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aspect that comes to the fore is the fact that, despite the early gruesome violence, 
and than the Romanian determination to go in line with the Nazi plans, paradoxi-
cally, by the end of the war, half of the Romanian Jews were still alive1. 
In this respect, anti-Semitism, already a tradition and a major constituency of 
the Romanian political culture by the time Antonescu and the Iron Guard came to 
power, yet only with the 1930s, and rather unsuccessfully, turned into state policy, 
is to offer but limited accounts when and if analyzed separately. Starting with the 
1920s, first the National Christian Defense League (LANC), and than the Iron 
Guard, turned Romanian anti-Semitism radical and eliminationist. Both A.C. Cuza 
and the legionari portrayed the Jewish minority as criminal and dangerous, para-
sitic and immoral, exploiting the Romanian ”proletarian” nation, disloyal to the 
state, therefore an enemy population that has to be watched, controlled, deprived 
of civil and political right and propriety, and whenever possible forced into emi-
gration or simply thrown outside the borders of Romania. The only, otherwise 
essential difference between the two major anti-Semitic parties was that 
C.Z. Codreanu and his legionari, unlike the Cuzişti, always depicted the struggle 
against the Jews as a life and death matter, as a war that has to be carried out not by 
legal means as at stake was the very survival of the nation2. Constantly reiterated 
by the radicals, this type of ideas and messages were on the long run mimetically 
imported by other politicians and parties, as to turn the Jewish Question into the 
most important issue in Romanian society. Consequently, banning the Jews was 
increasingly considered to be righteous, and a mean to save the country. Yet, most 
of the politicians at the time remained quite moderated in their anti-Semitic 
endeavor, stick to the law, and stressed the idea that all proposed solutions to the 
Jewish Question have to be ”civilized”3. 
The situation changed drastically from 1938 to 1940, with the collapse of the 
democratic system, and values. With the gap between declarations and intentions, 
and than state policy bridged hastily, Romania introduced several, progressively 
more severe anti-Semitic legislations, constantly deteriorating the situation of the 
Jews4. The worst was yet to come with September 1940, when Carol II political mis-
calculations facilitated the advent in power of an authoritarian and nationalistic 
general, Ion Antonescu, backed by a fascist party and militia, the Iron Guard. 
                                                    
1 See Robert S. WISTRICH, Hitler and the Holocaust, A Modern Library Chronicles Book, New 
York, 2003, pp, 155-157; Raul HILBERG, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders. The Jewish catastrophe, 
1933-1945, HarperCollins Publisher, New York, 1992, p. 85; Bela VAGO, ”The Reactions to the 
Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy in East-Central Europe and in the Balkans”, in François FURET (ed.), 
Unanswered Questions. Nazi Germany and the Genocide of the Jews, Schocken Books, New York, 1989, 
pp 231-232; Martin GILBERT, Holocaust. A History of the Jews of Europe During the Second World 
War, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1985, p. 637. 
2 ”Programul Ligii Apărării naţionale Creştine”, in Jean ANCEL (ed.), Documents Concerning 
the Fate of Romanian Jewry during the Holocaust, vol I, New York-Jerusalem, 1985-1986, doc. 10, 
p. 118; Corneliu Zelea CODREANU, ”Discurs parlamentar” (21 decembrie 1931), in Lya 
BENJAMIN (ed.), Documente. Comisia internaţională pentru studierea Holocaustului în România, 
Polirom, Iaşi, 2005, p. 54. 
3 CAROL II, ”Declaraţie de Presă”, Universul, 13 ianuarie, 1938. 
4 Christopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit. pp. 210-212. As Browning 
put it ”a proper anti-Semitic stance from Romania” was a way to improve the relation with 
Germany, deteriorated after the assassination of Codreanu. Romanian oil was not enough, nor the 
fact that Romania left the League of Nations. Nuremberg inspired legislation was introduced, 
increasing Romania’s dependency on Germany and generating a wave of spiraling anti-Semitism 
of a new type. 
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Within months, this uninspired political maneuver, aiming to divert the attention 
of the public opinion, in a desperate attempt to secure the position of the king and 
his entourage, the infamous camarilla, while giving satisfaction to a furious and 
frustrated population and army, anti-Semitic and thus ready to turn the Jews re-
sponsible not only for the territorial loses at the hands of the Soviets but for all the 
failures of Romania since 1920, was to generate a ravaging outburst of violence 
that would radically change the political landscape in Romania, and seal the fate of 
the Romanian Jewry1. This particular episode and the future development and dy-
namic of the events that altogether make the Romanian Holocaust indicate that an-
ger represents a factor that can not be ignored as it might shed a new light, provide 
a new range of nuances, offer new dimension to the understanding of Romania’s 
war regime eliminationist anti-Semitism, and thus facilitate the comprehension of 
the multifaceted process that led to genocide. 
In October 1942, in one of his (in)famous letters to the Romanian politicians 
and/or leaders of the Jewish community, Ion Antonescu, in an attempt to justify 
and legitimize his anti-Semitic policy, recalled the anger of Romanian politicians – 
and founding fathers of the modern state – of 1878 and 1923, spawn with the ”de-
grading and humiliating conditions” generated by the domestic and international 
pressures to grant citizenship to the Jews, ”which has led to the Judaization of the 
country and has compromised the Romanian economy and the purity of our 
race”2. This reference to the past was by no means accidental, allowed Antonescu 
to place himself in the line of traditional and respectful national(istic) politics, nev-
ertheless accuse the corrupted politicians of the time for ”capitulating” to the Jews 
and freemasons in establishing the democratic-liberal system, which granted con-
stitutional rights to non-Romanians. 
On that occasion Antonescu was not totally wrong as anger represented a key 
motivation in Romanian anti-Semitic politics long before the 1930s and 1940s. Ro-
manian liberal governments, as well as other parties and politicians paraded anger 
episodically, in 1878 and 1923 mainly as they had the sense of being humiliated, 
but also on other occasions. However, none of the Romanian governments before 
1940 turned to the armed forces as to turn anger into politics. Restrained by party 
discipline, liberal-parliamentarism and later democracy, and international treaties, 
Romanian politicians had to operate with basic political strategies3. In a formally 
liberal democracy, which Romania was before 1938, anti-Semitic anger rarely ex-
ceeded the form of a calculated dissent. Perpetuated and progressively turned into 
a key motivation, voiced by several emblematic figures of intellectuals and politi-
cians that constantly blended their organic nationalism with an often rabid 
anti-Semitism4, this kind of anger became the legacy of the authoritarian, national-
istic, and radical right thinkers for the fascist doers. 
Unlike Antonescu, the legionari, who were the first to take anti-Semitic anger 
that seriously as to turn it into politics, included references to Mihai Eminescu, 
Ioan Slavici, Nicolae Iorga, A.C. Cuza, Nicolae Paulescu and many other ”prophets 
                                                    
1 Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report. International Com-
mission on the Holocaust in Romania, Polirom, Iaşi, 2005, pp. 50-54. 
2 Jean ANCEL, ”Archival Sources concerning the Holocaust in Romania”, in Mihail 
IONESCU, Liviu ROTMAN (eds.), The Holocaust and Romania. History and Contemporary 
Significance, Editura Semne, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 65. 
3 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, Quandrangle, Chicago, 1961, p. 670. 
4 Michael MANN, Fascists, cit, p. 263. 
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of Romanian nationalism” but none of the traditional and respectful politicians, as 
the latest were the legionari political enemies. Moreover, such references were ren-
dered illogical as the legionari constantly stressed the idea that their political ideol-
ogy and program were brand new. Yet, despite their different (constructed) pedi-
grees, the legionari and Antonescu’s anger, and anti-Semitism, were intrinsically 
and intricately linked1. 
Romanian fascism, like all other European classic fascisms, was a modern, 
secularized form of millennialism and overtly utopian variant of revolutionary ex-
treme nationalism, at the heart of whose ideology, policies, tactics, and actions lies 
a vision of national rebirth in a post-liberal new order. Guided by a visionary elite, 
the Iron Guard had one major political task: to overcome the forces of decadence 
and disintegration and thus, turn the historical nation-state, and the core ethnic 
group, into a rejuvenated, harmonious community of destiny. The movement’s 
radical vision of society, and friend and foe strategic logic, which included numer-
ous alleged enemies (Jews, communists, liberals, and so on) that had to be purged 
along the way, led not only to the legitimization of violence but a sacralisation of it. 
A salvific doctrine born under ”wrecked circumstances”, and a ”divination of 
Romanianism”, promising the resurrection of the nation, a rebirth and regenerated 
New Man2, ready to fight and sacrifice himself ”not (for) a New but Another Roma-
nia”3 that would arise with its victory, Legionarism had no other goal than to raise 
Romania from misery to glory, and the Romanian soul from perdition to redemp-
tion. Furthermore, it aimed to create a mystical, transcendent brotherhood of new 
men, able to accomplish the national commandments failed by the politicians of 
the old generation4 – cleansing Romania of Jews and other ethnic minorities in-
cluded5. Consequently, the Legionar national and political revolution, the ”Great 
Palingenetic Event” of the ”generation of doers”, was to bring social justice, dig-
nity, purify the nation from foreign influences and Western models, and finally 
create a new, ethnocratic, ”Romania of the Romanians”, the ultimate solution to 
the existing crises6 and the only possible alternative to the atheist, positivist spirit 
of the French revolution of 1789 and the Romanian 1848 revolution7, as well as to 
the destructive, secular, mundane, anti-religious political religion of communism8. 
Aiming to redeem Romania ”from sin” by means of militant hyper-national-
ism, Iron Guard exploited the image of a weak and corrupt state, and portrait itself 
                                                    
1 By 1942, it would have been not only senseless but also impossible for Antonescu to include 
any reference to the ideology and politics of the legionari, his deadly enemies since January 1941.  
2 C.Z. Codreanu, the Căpitan of the Legion, and the great educator of his legionari was, like 
Mussolini, a Messiah evangelizing the masses and spreading the gospel of a new society and a 
new man, and, like Hitler, a crusader fighting the materialistic world, and Jews as agents of 
capitalism, liberalism, democracy, and bolshevism altogether.  
3 Radu IOANID, The Sword of the Archangel…cit, pp. 75-76. 
4 Vasile MARIN, ”Crez de generaţie: ideologia faptei”, Axa, 22 ianuarie 1933. 
5 Michael MANN, Fascists, cit, pp. 265-270. From late 19 century onward the dream of a 
Romanian nation purged of all non-Romanians elements, Jews first, was an aspiration for many 
nationalists. Unlike Codreanu, prone to his doctrine of acting and tactics of planned campaigns of 
violence, whose anti-Semitism was encapsulated in a ”death and mercy to the Jewish wasp nest” 
formula, most of the traditional nationalists were thinkers and not men of action. 
6 Vasile MARIN, ”Extremismul de dreapta”, Axa, 28 octombrie 1933; see also Mihail 
POLIHRONIADE, ”Proletariatul intelectual şi revoluţia naţională”, Lumea Nouă, V, nr. 2, 1936. 
7 See Nichifor CRAINIC, ”Omagiu unui adversar: d. C. Rădulescu Motru”, Calendarul, I, 
nr. 212, 7 noiembrie 1932. 
8 Ioan Victor VOJEN, ”Problema comunistă în Vechiul Regat”, Axa, I, nr. 4, 22 decembrie 1932. 
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as the only moral and political force able to mobilize the nation against the internal 
enemies. Ultra-nationalistic, rabid anti-Semitic and anti-communist, fanatic and vio-
lent, the Legion seduced the Romanians with the promise of a ”better place in the 
sun” for Romania, social justice and dignity for the integrated by the Legion peasants 
and workers, of a new state that would protect the Romanians, the People not the 
populace, from political manipulations and economic exploitation1. The costs to be 
paid along the road were irrelevant as long as the legionar revolution was to save 
Romania from an imminent and everlasting disaster2, and thus change the history 
and destiny of the nation3. Accordingly, anger represented a core constituency of the 
ideological matrix of the Iron Guard4, a revolutionary organization aiming to enforce 
an ideal vision of society, and implement politics of redemption that never excluded 
– in fact massively relied on – extensive use of physical compulsion to create a better 
world5. Obviously, Jews came among the most targeted groups, as for the legionari 
fighting the generic Jew and Judaism equated, one way or the other, the struggle 
against all the enemies of the legion, and Romania: moderate politicians, masons, lib-
eralism, democracy, parliamentarism, communism, capitalism and so on6. 
Fortunately, up to 1940, when they seized power together with Antonescu, the 
legionari were to a certain extent successfully restrained by the democratic experi-
ment. Furthermore, being much too rebellious and aiming for a total revolution 
from bellow, the legionari were overthrown from power within months, thus miss-
ing the chance to complete the radical departure of Romania from its ”traditional” 
structures, institutions, and norms. Unfortunately, for more than one decade, they 
had the time to ritualize and routinise, as thinkers but also as doers, their anger 
and aggressive vision that rejected any form of political accommodation, sublima-
tion, bargaining. As the events of 1940-1944 indicate, in many respects: the idea of 
national rebirth and national purification by means of ethnic-cleansing, the ideal-
ized Romania of the Romanians, politics of salvation based on a friend and foe 
logic, negations and style and so on; the fascists were the path breakers for An-
tonescu’s regime politics. 
Unlike the legionari, Antonescu was not mystical and revolutionary, his vision 
of politics was rather limited and more pragmatic. His nationalism was more 
primitive, less elaborated than the legionar one, but by no means less extreme: 
                                                    
1 Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, Nation-Building & Ethnic 
Struggle, 1918-1930, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993, pp. 336-337. 
2 Mircea ELIADE, ”De ce cred în biruinţa Mişcării Legionare”, Buna Vestire, I, nr. 241, 14 
decembrie 1937. 
3 IDEM, ”Noua aristocraţie legionară”, Vremea, XI, nr. 522, 23 ianuarie 1938. 
4 Legionar anger was not only natural and episodic but also simulated and constant, an 
elaborated ideological, political and cultural construct that often represented the very essence of 
the Iron Guard politics.  
5 Florin MÜLLER, ”The Antonescu Dictatorial Regime (September 6,1940-August 23, 1944). 
Sociopolitical and Ideological Dimensions”, in Mihail IONESCU, Liviu ROTMAN (eds.), The Holocaust 
and Romania...cit, p. 20. Contrary to the opinion of many historians, the legionar spirit, violence and 
anger was not altered by the 1938 purges and thereafter the advent to power of the Iron Guard.  
6 Mihai CHIOVEANU, Feţele fascismului. Politică, ideologie şi scrisul istoric în secolul XX, 
Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 314. Unlike the anti-Semitism of other 
nationalistic and radical right parties in Romania, the legionar one was not sectional. The idea 
that all Jews are enemies of the Romanians was turned by the legionar leadership into a 
monomaniacal obsession, while for other fascists it represented an essential element that had to 
be subordinated to the organization mystical ultra-nationalism. 
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”We have to inspire Romanians with hatred against the enemies of the 
nation. This is how I grew up, with hatred against the Turks, the Kikes and 
the Hungarians. This sentiment of hatred against the enemies of the nation 
must be pushed to the ultimate extremes”1. 
His idea to cleanse Romanian territories of alien oppressor2, strengthen the 
borders, and achieve national purity was rather reactive than part of a broader, 
proactive, modernizing vision of the nation3, Antonescu being nothing but a na-
tionalist that could and had to harness radical populism to anti-Semitism in par-
ticular, and xenophobia at large. Nevertheless, his anger, and extensive use of vio-
lence, also ”righteous”, and motivated by a fierce desire to change things for the 
better, were, at least when it came to the initial declarations, not marked by an irra-
tional and arbitrary pursuit of revenge, thus heading, like the legionar ones, to un-
wanted consequences and unsatisfactory result4. Still, within the context generated 
by the war, the ultimate expression of human anger5, with Romania sided by nazi 
Germany in its ”holly war” against USSR, the regime and its politics, marked by 
perpetual and ubiquitous paranoia, turned increasingly punitive, and finally gave 
up rational and controlled anger. 
An authoritarian leader, whose popularity and legitimacy was based on plebi-
scites, domestic order, prestige from sound victories on the front6, and a broad 
populist appeal supported by an irritable rejection of the old, corrupted, political 
system, Antonescu assumed autocratic powers on the ground of national emer-
gency and against the political parties, the royal dictatorship, and even his insur-
gent fascist ”children” when needed7. When it comes to fate of the Jews and the 
means to solve the Jewish question, the fact that Antonescu was not a ”revolution-
ary” fascist but an authoritarian, semi-reactionary politician, makes little differ-
ence. As the war fueled the political imagery of the regime with the external and 
internal threat represented by Judeo-bolshevism, and Jews as agents, saboteurs, 
and finally an enemy population, Antonescu turned his anger into legitimate 
politics. Ethnic cleansing became a priority, thus giving primacy to Antonescu over 
civilian establishment and securing the interest of the army, the professional prac-
titioners of violence8. By that time there was no need for the Antonescu’s regime 
to think, as everything was already in place: an ideology shaped by a century of 
                                                    
1 Ion Antonescu, quoted in Michael MANN, Fascists, cit, p. 290. 
2 Antonescu never gave up his plan of a purified Romania, and stated up to 1944 that if he 
would win the war all ethnic minorities would be purged in a ”civilized way”. Yet, from 1941 to 
1943 he made extensive use of anger, and vent vengeance on the weak and unprotected, meaning 
the Jews and the Roma, who, unlike other minorities (Poles, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Germans), 
were subjected to ethnic cleansing by mass killing and deportation. 
3 Michael MANN, Fascists, cit, pp. 294-295. 
4 Ion Antonescu was looking for a long term, legal, official, and coordinated revenge. For the 
legionari instant revenge was a priority, and meant to give them the sense of holding power, being 
unrestricted, a first and immediate confirmation of their political victory over the enemies. 
5 Peter CALVERT, ”Autocracy, Anger and the Politics of Salvation”, cit, p. 5. 
6 Florin MÜLLER, ”The Antonescu Dictatorial Regime…cit.”, p. 23. 
7 The conflict was generated not that much by ideological incompatibilities but by the fact 
that while for Antonescu the 6 September 1940 represented the end of a revolution, for the 
legionari it marked only its beginning. 
8 Like most armies, the Romanian one was an autocratic institution, hierarchically organized, 
with a rigid internal discipline, licensed to kill as to defend the state, no matter the form of government 
See Peter CALVERT, ”Autocracy, Anger and the Politics of Salvation”, cit, p. 6. 
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anti-Semitic thinking, the creation of an ethnocratic state as a political goal, no mat-
ter the costs and repercussions, a propaganda that motivated the perpetrators and 
demonized the victims thus turning them fit for the destruction1. 
On the first six months of 1940 Romania lost several provinces at the hands of 
the neighboring countries. The Romanian nation felt humiliated and betrayed, the 
Romanian army turned frustrated, Carol II dictatorship, as well as the political par-
ties and politicians were altogether distrusted, made responsible, and blamed for 
the collapse, finally, ethnic minorities were regarded as disloyal to the state and 
therefore as enemy populations. In the case of Bessarabia and North Bukovina 
more than in other cases, the Jewish population of the two provinces was accused 
on the basis of a long lasting political myth for helping the Red Army, acting as 
Bolshevik agents, propagating communist ideas, attacking the Romanian army, 
and terrorizing the Romanian population2. This image was as powerful as to later 
motivate and justify the anti-Semitic policy of the Antonescu regime, and the 
atrocities perpetrated by the Romanian army, gendarmerie, and sometimes civilian 
from 1941 onward3. However, a closer look into the events suggests that in 1940 
and later on 1941 the Romanian authorities overreacted as to turn the accusations 
into a rationale for the mass killing and deportation of the Moldavian, Bessarabian 
and Bukovinian Jews4. 
For some of the anti-Semites, the events of June 1940 were but a confirmation of 
their fears and, consequently, just struggle against the Jews, while others live the 
reader with the impression that they were suddenly and abruptly ”illuminated”. As 
Nicolae Iorga blatantly put it in his ”Why so much hatred?” article, published in Nea-
mul românesc of July 6, 1940, voicing his anger and nonetheless his anti-Semitism: 
”Is this the reward for our benevolence and tolerance? We have ac-
cepted the Jewish seizure and domination for many decades, and Jewry is 
taking revenge in these hard times in which we are living. And there is no 
disownment, from anywhere, no vehement and public break with the acts of 
the murderous gangs of sanguinary sect members. Organized madness 
against us has swept boroughs, towns, and villages”. 
Following the same logic, Ion Antonescu was to reply Fildermann in October 
1941, in a public letter, that the Romanian killings and the deportation of the Jews to 
Transnistria were in response to Jewish hate and the suffering of the Romanians from 
June 1940. This time, past events were recalled as to trigger present deeds, namely 
ethnic cleansing5. However, the text lives the reader with a strong sense of a simu-
lated anger, with betrayal, grievance, and national reassertion, turned into a perfect 
travesty and strong justification for the horrific treatment applied to the Jews: 
”You wish now to transform yourselves from accused into accusers, act-
ing as if you have forgotten the reason which caused the situation of which 
                                                    
1 Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report…cit., pp. 114, 132. 
2 George VOICU, ”The Notion of Judeo-Bolshevism in Romanian wartime Press”, Studia 
Hebraica, nr. 4, 2004, pp. 59-64. 
3 After 1990 this episode was used by some Romanian historians, such as Florin Constan-
tiniu and Gheorghe Buzatu, as to explain, justify, and even excuse the Romanian atrocities and 
anti-Semitism of 1941-1944. See Sorin ALEXANDRESCU, Paradoxul român, cit., p. 156. 
4 Michael BURLEICH, The Third Reich, A New History, Pan Books, London, 2001, pp. 610, 
613-614. 
5 Ibidem, pp. 625-626. 
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you complain […] From the cellars of Chişinău our martyrs are removed 
daily, terribly mutilated cadavers thus rewarded for the friendly hand which, 
for twenty years, they stretched out to those ungrateful beasts…”1. 
In other words, it indicates that with the attack on USSR Antonescu seized 
the opportunity to not that much ”trample down the cringing shades of yesterday 
dishonor” but, behind the display of a vengeful, bellicose, and xenophobic ideol-
ogy, to articulate a strong rationale for his genocidal policy. The fact that An-
tonescu knew months before about the nazi plan to invade USSR, as well as their 
intention to exterminate the Soviet Jews and political commissars in Aktionen, is to 
strength the argument. The Romanians were made aware on the future develop-
ments of the extermination plan by their partners, and had the time to plan their 
own war for extermination2. 
In June 1940, whit the retreat of the Romanian troops from Bessarabia and 
North Bukovina to Moldova, numerous but scattered deadly assaults on the Jews 
by civilians and soldiers, and one massacre – the Dorohoi pogrom, generated by 
panic, frustration, therapeutical violence, lack of discipline, and a recrudescence of 
anti-Semitism – occurred in the Old Kingdom. Out of fear of disorders, panic, and 
anarchy, Romanian civil and military authorities made efforts to stop the violence, 
isolate the aggressors, reorganize military units, and reestablish control and order 
as to diminish the side effect of the deep crises. Though protecting the Jewish 
population was no priority3, with some local authorities even issuing express or-
ders to custom officers not to allow any Bessarabian Jew to cross the border into 
Romania, as they were soviet agents4, the attitude of the authorities triggered even 
more anti-Semitism, and spread anger and hate toward the Jews5. Moreover, most 
of the military reports insisted on the fact that most of the communists attacking 
the army and the authorities in Bessarabia were Jewish – references to Jewish 
groups mobilized with the attack of the Red Army as to harass the Romanian 
army, loot, kill, terrorize the population and the authorities, desecrate the Roma-
nian national symbols, and so on; were often included6. Other reports mention the 
great number of Romanian Jews trying to cross the border into the Soviet territory, 
thus indicating their hostility toward the Romanian state7. Soon, most of the au-
thorities were to accept the idea that all the attacks and acts of revenge on the Jews 
in Romania were totally justified by the hostile attitude of the Bessarabian Jews8, 
and later on came to the conclusion that one way or another the Jewish question – 
like when there were no other critical issues ranging from domestic to international 
policy, army equipment and discipline, and so on; to explain the crisis – has to be 
solved. The government started working on a new, radical version of We the People, 
                                                    
1 Ion Antonescu, quoted in Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, cit., pp. 226-227.  
2 Jean ANCEL, ”Archival Sources concerning the Holocaust in Romania”, cit, pp. 62-63. 
3 Mihai STOENESCU, Armata, Mareşalul şi Evreii, RAO, Bucureşti, 1998, pp. 141-142. 
4 AMR, fond Microfilme, reel 1078, c 0572. 
5 Though a significant number of civilians, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Romanians, 
dissatisfied with the corruption, abuses and bad treatment by the Romanian authorities in 
Bessarabia since 1918 welcomed the arrival of the soviets, it was mainly for the Jews to be held 
responsible and demonized. Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania…cit., pp. 112, 
122-123, 149; also Mihai STOENESCU, Armata, Mareşalul şi Evreii, cit, pp. 66-67. 
6 Arh. MapN, fond MStM, dosar 941, fila 558. 
7 AMR, fond 948, dosar 941, file 217-226. 
8 ANIC, fond PCM, dosar 482/1940, fila 18. 
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taking the nazi anti-Semitic legislation as both a juridical and political role model, 
in a pursuit of a not yet transcendental but definitely cleansing nation-statism by 
means of law1. The ideal ”Romania for the Romanians” was reiterated, and so was 
”ethnic purification”, with deprivation of rights, emigration, and border exchanges 
of population as ”civilized means” to achieve it2. 
This time, unlike in other occasions, the clichés: the Jew as a Communist agent, 
the Jewish disloyal, enemy population and so on, were the product of army and in-
telligence, and meant to intoxicate the state and army leadership. Media, some-
times circulating terrific, often fictional stories by soldiers and Romanian refugees, 
launched a virulent anti-Semitic campaign that ultimately generated a real psycho-
sis, with the desperate efforts of the authorities to play it down by means of censor-
ship lingering unsuccessful3. The banned at the time legionari, and the nazis, had a 
rather insignificant contribution. 
The new government, headed by Ion Antonescu, installed on the 6 September 
1940 by the king as a desperate measure to secure his position, did not radically 
departed from this type of approach toward the Jewish question, at least not in the 
first months. The resolution to the Jewish Question, ”vital for the Romanian peo-
ple”, excluded, at least in theory and declarations, any violent means, had to be 
progressive and methodical as not to jeopardize the existing economic order, and 
offend the dignity and morality of the Romanians4. With Antonescu in favor of 
state authority and law as pillars of the new Romanian Order, the legitimate and 
just ”liberation from the yoke of foreign exploiters”, was not to exceed confiscation 
of Jewish rural proprieties, concentration of Jews in urban areas, emigration when-
ever possible5. 
This type of legalist attitude and tactics render the legionari anger and frus-
trated as for them, as well as for some of the local authorities and nevertheless ci-
vilians infected with the fascist virus6 there was no need for a protective toward 
the Jews legal framework, which was but to haze and postpone the Romanianiza-
tion process – confiscation of propriety – isolation, pauperization, and finally emi-
gration of Jews from a land were there was no future for them. The legionari were 
looking for rapid results, and thus favored swift and violent, arbitrary methods7. 
Traces of the future conflict between Antonescu and the legionari are visible even in 
respect to the two conflicting approaches toward the Jewish question of the fascist 
and the authoritarian camps. The differences were so visible that the leaders of the 
Jewish community regarded Antonescu, ”an authoritarian and moral man” as they 
put it, as a protector of the law, begging him not to follow the fascist path, and not 
to turn the Jewish question into a political diversion and springboard. Unfortu-
nately, this is exactly what Antonescu did once the legionari were defeated. Only 
his approach was sectional, not all Jews being, as for the legionari, equally danger-
ous and therefore subjected to purges. 
In the case of Antonescu it was chiefly for the ”Bolshevik-Jew” catchy theme 
to make his special interest as to become a monomaniacal obsession. As official 
                                                    
1 Lya BENJAMIN, Legislaţia anti-evreiască, Editura Hasefer, Bucureşti, 1993, doc. 4, pp. 51-54. 
2 ANIC, Fond PCM, dosar 327/1940, file 31-32. 
3 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Documente. Comisia internaţională…cit., pp. 73-74, 78-79. 
4 ANIC, fond PCM, CM, dosar 1770/1940, vol. 2, file 783-784. 
5 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Documente. Comisia internaţională…cit., pp. 111-112. 
6 Jean ANCEL (ed.), Documents…cit., vol. I, doc. 121, pp. 528-530. 
7 Lya BENJAMIN, Legislaţia anti-evreiască, cit., doc. 16, pp. 74-78. 
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documents indicate, on several occasion, Ion Antonescu and the legionar minister 
of interior, general Petrovicescu discussed the situation and activity of communists 
in Romania, ”of which 90% are kikes”, and proposed solutions as to put an end to 
the threat: expulsion for the Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians, and concentration 
camps for the Jews1. However, not only some Jewish Bolshevik agents were tar-
geted but the entire Jewish population in Romania, as they were working against 
the Romanian state, and the Bessarabian Jews, crossing the border in organized 
groups as to make propaganda in favor of USSR and against Romania, thus incit-
ing the Romanian ones to turn against the authorities2. That was, according to nu-
merous official reports, to explain the ”defiant” and pro-soviet attitude of Jews in 
Moldova in general, and Iaşi in particular, in spite of the ”deep fear” of the very 
same population of potential armed retaliation for present and also past attitude 
and participation in anti-Romanian actions. Consequently, following the implaca-
ble logic of ”we do not know who are guilty ones, they are all guilty”, Antonescu, 
one of the Grand Symplificateurs of his time, continued to take advantage of the 
echo of the 1940 events, and the fabricated presence of a shrewd and cruel Jewish 
enemy within and outside the borders of Romania as to offer a rationale for his fu-
ture policies3. Within months, the Romanian army, in many cases the same military 
units that left the province in the summer of 1940, entered in Bessarabia in a set up, 
foul state of mind, motivated by anger and revenge, this time convinced that the 
Jew is the mortal enemy of the Romanians. 
Meanwhile, the impatient legionari, unhappy with the long preparations and 
delays, continued to attack the Jewish population, loot, destroy, and kill, coming 
soon to the conclusion that a massive strike against the Jewish peril and his allies 
and protectors, Antonescu and his oligarchic regime included, is needed4. In Janu-
ary 1941, in less then three days, more than 120 Jews were slaughter in unimagin-
able ways, Synagogues burned out, and Jewish stores were devastated during a 
bloody pogrom5. 
Antonescu had the power and the means to stop, if not to prevent, the pogrom 
but no reason. For him, the legionar assault on the Jews was an opportunity to de-
monize his radical and rebellious partners on one hand, and a perfect litmus test 
for his future actions on the other, indicating to what degree the civil population 
would support similar strikes, or turn into indifferent and/or intimidated and thus 
reduced to silence bystanders6. Moreover, his victory over the rebellious, which 
was to put an end to the reign of terror, was to shed a new light on the govern-
ment, state institutions and the army, creating a positive image and generating a 
degree of confidence that they all desperately needed after the failure of 1940. 
Lastly, anger and personal feelings also played an important role. No matter how 
much he disliked the ”legionar gangsterism”, Antonescu had no reason, and could 
not find one, to protect the Jews, who that much harmed Romania in the past. As 
                                                    
1 Marcel-Dumitru CIUCĂ, Aurelian TEODORESCU, Bogdan Florin POPOVICI (eds.), 
Stenogramele consiliului de miniştri în perioada guvernării Antonescu, vol. I, Arhivele Naţionale ale 
României, Bucureşti, 1997, pp. 366, 601, 628, 687. 
2 Arh. MapN, dosar 155, fila 162-172. 
3 Mihai STOENESCU, Armata, Mareşalul şi Evreii, cit., p. 95. 
4 Michael BURLEICH, The Third Reich…cit., pp. 610-611.  
5 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit, p. 672. 
6 Michael BURLEICH, The Third Reich…cit., p. 611. 
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he blatantly put it: ”I will not sacrifice Romanian lifes (of officers and soldiers) to 
protect the kikes”1. 
Crushed by Antonescu and his army2, the legionari missed the moment to im-
plement their political vision and program. Yet, as individuals they were allowed 
to further display their hate toward the generic Jew, the Bolshevik-Jew, the diabolic 
Jewish conspiracy against civilization and culture, to instigate and indoctrinate the 
population and the army rank and file, and take part in the massacres, this time as 
soldiers and civilians, and not members of a fascist party and militia3. One way or 
the other, they legitimized the policy and actions of Antonescu who, on his turn, 
sponsored their newspapers. War propaganda relied heavily on former legionar 
and pro-legionar publications when it came to the ”holly war against bolshevism 
and the Jew”, the ”eternal enemy” with myriad faces (agent, exploiter, disloyal, 
terrorist, spy, saboteur and so on and so forth)4. 
With the legionari defeated and the Iron Guard banned, the situation of the 
Jews did not changed for the better, as many might have hoped, at least not in the 
long run. Except for street violence and random terror the semi-reactionary regime 
of Antonescu was not that different from the fascist one. Romanianization contin-
ued and it was justified as part of the process of national rebirth and purification, 
and anger was turned progressively into a political motivation as Antonescu’s dis-
courses and policies included more and more references to Jewish saboteurs, Jew-
ish communists, an enemy population siding Romania’s external enemies, whether 
USSR or Hungary. Fewer and fewer Jews were trusted by the authorities and con-
sidered loyal, and not even they were desirable on a long run5. 
Before the war started, Jews from Moldavian villages were deported to towns 
and camps in South Romania6. The effort to remove the Jewish population away 
from the front line, otherwise irrational, non-realistic, lacking logic, and indicating 
the monomaniacal obsession with the Jewish peril7 was designed not so much to 
secure the area but to incite the population8 and the army reminding them that the 
Jews are a disloyal and suspected enemy population9. The final preparations for 
the invasion of USSR were to trigger a rampant anti-Semitism as to facilitate ethnic 
cleansing by means of deportation and mass killing. Official military reports from 
                                                    
1 Pe marginea prăpastiei. 21-23 ianuarie 1941. vol. 1-2, Editura Scripta, Bucureşti, 1992, pp. 126, 
138, 149, 154. 
2 Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report…cit., p. 110. The 
rebellion represents a failed attempt of the Iron Guard to conquer the state and its institutions. 
The legionar terror generated repulsion along army, police and gendarmerie lines.  
3 Radu IOANID, The Sword of the Archangel…cit., pp. 74-75. 
4 Aurel POPOVICIU, ”Un popor de duşmani, trădători şi spioni care n-au iubit niciodată pe 
români”, Curentul, an XIV, nr. 4809, 7 iulie, 1941. 
5 Lya BENJAMIN, Problema evreiască, Editura Hasefer, Bucureşti, doc. 71, pp. 190-191. 
6 Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report…cit., p. 118. 
7 As Eugen Cristescu, the chief of the Romanian intelligence, put it, it would have sufficed to 
watch closely and control an already terrorized and terrified population. See Mihai STOENESCU, 
Armata, Mareşalul şi Evreii, cit., p. 235. 
8 On the return of the survivors of the two death trains from Călăraşi back to Iaşi, many 
civilians expressed their dissatisfaction that the kikes escaped as to return. 
9 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Documente. Comisia internaţională…cit., pp. 186-188. The deportation 
was for the government a pre-emptive strike meant to remove a ”hostile population” away from 
the front line. Any attempt from the Jews to disobey the orders was punished by shooting. The 
police had the task to identify all potential instigators and soviet agents among Jewish males from 
16 to 60 years old, and send them to camps. 
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that period indicate that the myth of the Bolshevik-Jew was already at work, and 
anger a strong political motivation as the entire ”Judeo-Bolshevik population” was 
to be evacuated, and all Jewish males were considered suspects, an thus subjected 
to summary investigations and execution by shooting1. 
When war broke out, and Einsatzgruppen D was sent to the front, in Iaşi, they 
were to ”rapidly discover they arrived amid a genocide already well underway”2. 
Though imprecise, as the German special killing squads were already in there at 
the beginning of the pogrom, and took part in it, Michael Burleich’s account makes 
its point. The initiative and coordination for the mass slaughter in Iaşi goes to the 
Romanians. The pogrom, carried out by Romanian state institutions, in a frontier 
city with 50% of the population Jewish, and a hotbed of radical and rabid 
anti-Semitism, where from June 1940 to June 1941 Jews were continuously under 
attack from legionari and Bessarabian refugees, ended up with more than 10 000 
victims. Due the existence of a great aversion toward the Jews the authorities were 
aware of, there was no need for Antonescu to issue any specific orders before, only 
later to justify the deeds in an official communicate. Communist Jews were (made) 
responsible for the events in Iaşi, with 500 Bolshevik-Jews executed for their 
crimes3. Propaganda did the rest, announcing that the ”Bolshevik kike” was wiped 
out from the city of Ştefan the Holly and Great4. No matter what the Iaşi Jews 
might have done, or would have done in June 1941, their fate was sealed long be-
fore. But the pick of one long year of abuses, arrests, beatings, persecutions, hate 
speech, and so on; the pogrom was the final test before launching the ethnic clean-
sing operations in Bessarabia and Bukovina. The local authorities, which were en-
couraged to keep the order by all means, the Romanian army, no longer victimized 
by the state propaganda but presented in the aftermath of the pogrom as heroic, 
with its pride retrieved and the ”shame of 1940 washed in the blood of the Jewish 
plague”, lastly the civilians, who had to act patriotically, indicating to the police all 
the ”suspects and strangers, under penalty of death”5, were tested one more time. 
On a special order, issued on 4 July 1941, Ion Antonescu disapproves the 
methods, the violence, massacres and lootings, by civilians and soldiers, but not 
the ends. However, from that moment all initiatives to cleanse Romania of Jews as 
to fulfill the expectations of the Romanian people rested with the government6. De-
portation, ghettoization, extermination were officially turned into state organized 
and sponsored policy7. 
Rather hard for the reader to believe that in the case of the Iaşi pogrom the 
government and the local authorities were not in control, or lost it, and that made 
possible the unrestrained outburst of sweeping anti-Semitic violence8. A further 
look into the events suggests that the authorities reiterated and further fueled the 
psychosis of 1940, and later allowed the army, gendarmerie, police, and civilians to 
have their own struggle, and revenge, against the Jewish enemy. Yet, this time, 
anger was triggered by both past events and present deadlocks, as the Jewish 
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population was held responsible for, and as to explain, the slow advance of the Ro-
manian army into the Soviet territory – the pogrom took place on the 28-30 June 
1941, one week after the troops entered Bessarabia, with poor results1. 
On the 8 July 1941, prime-Minister Mihai Antonescu delivered a speech to the 
cabinet, deriding soapy vaporous philosophical humanitarianism of the tradition-
alist when it comes to the Jewish Question, furthermore informing his ministers 
that from that moment on ethnic cleansing became a state matter and governmen-
tal venture, thus moving beyond riots, random terror, and pogroms: 
”You must be merciless […] I do not know when, after how many centu-
ries, the Romanian nation will again enjoy this total freedom of action, with 
the possibility for ethnic purification and national revision. This is the hour 
when we are masters on our territory. Let it be used! I do not mind if history 
judges us barbarians. The Roman Empire performed a series of barbarous 
acts against its contemporaries, and yet it was the greatest political establish-
ment. There are no other favorable moments in our history. If needed be, 
shoot with machine guns, and I say that there is no law”2. 
The very same ideas were exposed within days, on the 12 July 1941, also by 
the prime-Minister, at a meeting organized by the ministry of interior with the civil 
administration of Bessarabia and Bukovina, as to inform them on the necessity and 
meaning of a new concept, ”cleansing the ground”: 
”This is the broadest and most favorable opportunity in our history for a 
total ethnic unfettering, for a national revision, and for cleansing our people 
of all those elements foreign of our soul..(that)..darken its future”3. 
As a result, a Hell on Earth was brought with the Romanian troops entering in 
Bessarabia and Bukovina and acting as an Iron Broom, cleansing villages and 
towns by massacres, causing 25 000 deaths in less than one month4. As a memoir of 
Traian Popovici, former mayor of Cernowitz indicates, the Romanian troops seized 
the opportunity to release their long accumulated anger and hate, treating the Jews 
as an enemy population and as to achieve the political goal of the government, the 
physical destruction of the Jews5. 
A huge number of Bessarabian and Bukovinian Jews died in the first days and 
weeks after the invasion, and most of them thereafter, to the end of 1942. In some 
cases the entire population of one village was killed on the spot, in other cases only 
the leaders of the community, often Rabies and well-doing, middle class Jews that 
were by no means communists. Like in Iaşi, in most cases, there was no need for 
exact orders from above, as the central authorities preferred to let the anger and 
thirst of revenge work as to put things in motion, than reestablishing order within 
days6. Yet, nothing was accidental but carefully orchestrated by the authorities. 
Plans were designed for the removal of the Jews from the liberated territories by 
organized teams that had to act prior to the arrival of the troops. According to the 
Chief of general Staff, Iosif Iacobovici: 
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”The mission of these teams is to create in villages an unfavorable at-
mosphere towards the Judaic elements, thereby encouraging the population 
to seek and remove them on its own by whatever means it finds most appro-
priate and suited to the circumstances. At the arrival of the Romanian troops, 
the feeling must already be in place and even acted upon”1. 
The strategy was simple and efficient: first offer satisfaction to the mob and 
vengeful army, allowing them to kill and loot, second deport the survivors to the 
camps in Transnistria or simply force them across the Bug2. According to general 
Constantin Vasiliu, mass killing on the spot was favored indicating that cleansing 
the ground means what it says: 
”Exterminate on the spot all Jews in rural areas; arrest all suspects, party 
activists, and people who held accountable positions under the soviet author-
ity, and send them under escort to the (gendarmerie) legion”3 
A specific and crystal clear order that at the lower level was often translated 
in terms of: 
”Exterminate all Jews, from the babe in arms to the impotent old man, 
all of them endanger the Romanian nation”4. 
No attempts were ever made by the government and the officers to put an end 
to the killings, on contrary, as violence against the Jewish enemy population was 
righteous and meant to further strength the combat spirit of an army fighting not 
against civilians but soviet agents and partisans5. As Mihai Antonescu put it: 
”Our Army has been humiliated, forced to pass under the Caudine Forks 
of its barbaric enemies, accompanied solely by the treacherous scorn of the 
accomplices of Bolshevism […] who had desecrated the altar in the land of 
our ancestors […] the Yids”6. 
Blaming the Jews not only for the events of 1940 but for all the evils of the so-
viet occupation, accusing them for acting as communist agents and collaborators, 
demonizing them when depicting the destroyed churches and the mass graves of 
the 200 000 Romanians killed by the Soviets7, the authorities kept the killing ma-
chine oiled and ready for brutal and swift, spontaneous and disorganized, dis-
persed and capricious massacres that are unique in the history of the Holocaust, 
the result of an odd mixture of destructive spirit and opportunism8. The Jewish 
population was aware, though not responsible, of all the horrors made by the Sovi-
ets and circulated by the Romanian propaganda, as they were also aware of the 
Romanian ”revenge”, thus running by thousands to USSR, only to be captured 
later and executed by the Romanians and the Germans, in Odessa. 
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The harbor city of Odessa in Crimea, which was never part of Romania, was 
conquered by the Romanian army after a long and grim siege ended with heavy 
loses, more than 70 000. That was to make the Romanians enter the city in a ”foul 
frame of mind”1, with reprisals starting before Antonescu issuing any orders2. The 
Conducător (Antonescu) was only later to legitimize and justify the terrible massa-
cre perpetrated by the army against Jewish civilians, and not only in terms of re-
taliation for the bomb attack on the Romanian headquarters. In a letter to Filder-
mann he stresses the direct or indirect guilt and responsibility of the entire Jewish 
population, acting as Bolshevik commissars, agents, and collaborators, pushing 
from behind the Russians troops in a senseless massacre against the Romanian: 
”Did you give any thought last year to what was in our hearts during 
the evacuation of Bessarabia and what is happening to us daily and hourly 
when we are paying with our blood […] with very much blood for the hatred 
of your co-religionists in Bessarabia, to the manner in which we were treated 
during our withdrawal from Bessarabia, and upon our return from the Dni-
ester to Odessa and in the regions of the Sea of Azov? […] During the Bolshe-
vik occupation, those whom you now bewail, informed on good Romanians, 
thus surrendering them to the orgies of the Russians and bringing grief and 
mourning into numerous Romanian homes […] Do not pity, if you really 
have a soul, those who do not deserve it, pity those who merit it”3. 
This time, anger played a more important role than ethnic cleansing, with the 
retaliations resulting in 19 000 Jews killed in Odessa proper, and 40 000 more in 
Dalnic, outside the city. Most of them were Jewish refugees from Bessarabia, and 
thus, one way or the other, targeted for extermination4. 
By the time Romanian army reached and conquered Odessa at the end of Au-
gust, beginning of September 1941, due the impact of the events, failures, loses, 
dissatisfaction, and the continuous demonization of the Jewish people, Antonescu 
was already in the logic and line of his former partners, the legionari: Jew was 
Satan, and the war but a life and death struggle against him: 
”The fight is Bitter. It is a fight of life or death. It is a fight between us 
and the Germans, and the Jews […] I shall undertake a work of complete 
cleansing, of Jews and of all others who have snuck up on us [...] had we nor 
started this war, to cleanse our race of these people who sap our economic, 
national, and physical life, we would be cursed with complete disappearance 
[…] Consequently, our policy in this regard is to achieve a homogeneous 
whole in Bessarabia, Bukovina, Moldova, and, I and you, if we live, and if not 
someone else, in Transylvania”. 
And continued: 
”Do not think that when I decided to disinfest the Romanian people of 
all Jews, I did not realize I would be provoking an economic crises […] dam-
ages to the nation. But if I win this war, the nation will receive its compen-
sation. We are undergoing a crisis because we are removing the Jews […] 
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Should we miss this historical opportunity now, we’ll miss it forever […] 
And if the Jews win the war, we’ll no longer exist”1. 
The war against the Jews was no longer a matter of tactics or profit but sur-
vival. Moreover, with Antonescu coming closer and closer to Hitler’s vision: ”At 
the end of this struggle we will cleanse the world of them, or become the slaves of 
the Jewish Beast”, the fate of the Moldavian, Bukovinian and Bessarabian Jews was 
sealed forever. They were to be all deported into Transnistria2. 
For the Romanian government Transnistria was a dumping ground for ethnic 
undesirables, mainly Jews but also Roma3. At the same time, it was also a trap for 
the Romanian administration, as the first intention was to push the Jews and Roma 
across the Bug, and abandon them at the hands of the Germans. Unprepared as 
they were, the Romanians turned the deportation to the camps into a death sen-
tence. Tens of thousands died here of typhus and starvation, in mass killings, 
whether preventive or simply outbursts of therapeutical violence, executed by the 
Romanians alone, together with German police and the Ukrainians, or at the hand 
of the SS and the Todt4. Some of the episodes were as horrible and cruel as to leave 
the fortuitous eye witness with the impression that he lives again scenes from the 
legionar rebellion, with the slaughter performed this time under the patronage of 
the state and army, and not of the Green Beast5. Few returned, from 1943 onward, 
mainly orphans, with Antonescu bitterly opposing the solution as unacceptable 
and unpopular, dangerous and catastrophic6. 
From June 1941 to August 1944, the Romanian government, army, gendarme-
rie, and police, implemented an ethnic cleansing policy that took them, step by 
step, from mass killing to ghettoization, deportations, the nazi Final Solution, 
finally emigration, which by no means was motivated by humanitarianism7. Ro-
mania’s government made no attempt to save any Jew. True, half of the Romanian 
Jews survived the war. Yet this is due to domestic and international protests and 
interventions, massive bribe, a rapidly changing military and political situation 
after the battle of Stalingrad. Prestige also played an important role. When the 
Romanian authorities realized that they lost the initiative and control over the 
deportation of the Jews living in Romania for the Final Solution at the hands of the 
Nazi bureaucrats, a situation they disliked as it portrayed them as controlled, 
puppets and ordinary Executioneries, the government made desperate efforts to 
depart from the nazi plan. Postponing the deportations, later on abandoning the 
plan from late 1942 to early 1943, and thereafter mocking the SS, the government 
made several attempts to improve Romania’s image in the West8. They went as far 
as to falsify and destroy documents, and rejected the advise of the nazi officials to 
continue with the implementation of the Final Solution as it was already too late 
for Romania to persuade the Western allies on its innocence when it comes to the 
Holocaust. However it would be a mistake to interpret the Romanian policy on the 
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basis of political and military tactics and calculation, and in the absence of anti-Semi-
tism as an ideology and ethnic cleansing as a political goal1. 
From 1941 onward, a free of Jews Romania was for Antonescu and his regime 
a major aspiration and a legacy for the future. Up to 1944, at least Ion Antonescu 
continued to justify his policy in terms of revenge and survival, expressing his re-
grets that he refrained from deporting all Jews from Romania due to international 
and domestic pressures2. Antonescu portrayed himself as a Savior of the state and 
nation, and believed in his mission. As his initial plans, reforms, and hopes failed 
away, with no possibility to give satisfaction and respond to the huge expectations 
of the population, he rapidly turned to war as a way out from the existing crises. 
Once he touched the limits of his governance, and in impossibility to find further 
excuses – such as the monstrous legacy of the corrupted Carol II regime, and the 
disaster generated by the legionari – he turned, as others before him to the Jew, the 
eternal scape goat. War on USSR, and the Jews was for him like a breath of fresh 
air. Anger was turned into a strong political motivation, and ethnic cleansing into a 
policy that was to solve all past and present problems. From 1942 onward, the Ro-
manian government abandoned anger as a political motivation as it proved to be 
extremely corrosive to the structure of an ordered society. It also gave up military 
violence in favor of bureaucratic violence. For many Romanian and Ukrainian Jews 
that shift came already too late. 
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